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Patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC)—especially the ventral and medial parts of
PFC—often show a marked inability to make choices that meet their needs and goals. These decision-
making impairments often reflect both a deficit in learning concerning the consequences of a choice, as
well as deficits in the ability to adapt future choices based on experienced value of the current choice.
Thus, areas of PFC must support some value computations that are necessary for optimal choice.
However, recent frameworks of decision making have highlighted that optimal and adaptive decision
making does not simply rest on a single computation, but a number of different value computations may
be necessary. Using this framework as a guide, we summarize evidence from both lesion studies and
single-neuron physiology for the representation of different value computations across PFC areas.
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It has been over 150 years since the case of Phineas Gage—the
rail worker who suffered a traumatic accident in which an iron rod
was propelled through the front of his brain—highlighted the
importance of the ventral and medial parts of the prefrontal cortex
in decision making. Damasio and colleagues (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1994; Damasio & Van
Hoesen, 1983; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) since documented the
cases of several more patients with damage similar to that of
Phineas Gage—that is, to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the peri- and sub-
genual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)—and demonstrated in
most cases, perhaps surprisingly, that these patients perform within
the normal range in neuropsychological tests of intelligence, mem-
ory, and cognitive function. However, in real life, patients with
such frontal lobe brain damage are far from normal; they live
disorganized lives, tend to be impatient, vacillate when making
decisions, often invest their money in risky ventures and exhibit
socially inappropriate behavior (e.g., are grossly profane or indif-
ferent to the feelings of others). In other words, their defining
feature is that they consistently make poor choices.
One notable finding is that these types of dramatic decision-
making deficits are seldom found with damage outside of the PFC;
in fact, these functions seem largely to depend on the orbital and
medial parts of PFC (OFC and VMPFC) and ACC, as damage to
the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) does not appear to cause
similar profound impairments in value-guided decisions unless
correct behavior is determined by rules (Baxter, Gaffan, Kyriazis,
& Mitchell, 2008; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998;
Buckley et al., 2009; Fellows, 2006; Fellows & Farah, 2003;
Fellows & Farah, 2007; Wheeler & Fellows, 2008). This implies
that we should be able to discover something fundamentally spe-
cial about the functions of these three PFC areas to allow them to
support appropriate decision making.
Perhaps the first insight into this question came in the 1970s,
when Niki and Watanabe (1976, 1979) recorded from single neu-
rons in ACC and later also in LPFC. They found that neurons in
both regions were modulated by whether the animal received a
reward, and some only when receiving reward in the context of a
correct response. The work of Rolls and colleagues (Rolls, Sien-
kiewicz, & Yaxley, 1989; Rolls, Yaxley, & Sienkiewicz, 1990;
Thorpe, Rolls, & Maddison, 1983) began to focus on the functions
of OFC in the 1980s and found evidence that neurons in this part
of PFC encoded the sensory properties of reward, encoded links
between stimuli and reward, and seemed to encode information
about satiety state. Years later it was found that LPFC neurons not
only differentiated multiple rewards, but the value scale encoded
by LPFC neurons reflected the subjective reward preferences of
the animal (Watanabe, 1996). In a similar manner, it was shown
that OFC neurons encoded reward preference but that neurons here
adjust their response based on the relative value of the rewards
available (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999).
Still, in all of these cases, neuronal activity was recorded in the
absence of any direct choice between possible outcomes of posi-
tive value (i.e., only one available option was rewarded); rather
activity was correlated with conditioned stimuli that predicted
rewards or with the rewards themselves. It was not until Shima and
Tanji (1998) documented that single neurons in ACC were sensi-
tive to reductions in reinforcement value concomitant with a
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.change in behavioral response, that we had clear evidence of a
neuronal correlate in PFC or ACC that might reflect a decision-
making process. Nonetheless, at the very end of the 20th century
we had evidence that single neurons in PFC encoded the value of
outcomes and conveyed information about when to adapt decision
making, representations which might provide a functional expla-
nation for the decision-making deficits present in patients with
ventral and medial PFC damage.
However, as interest in this field grew in the 21st century, we
discovered a new confounding issue; many (if not all) areas within
the frontal cortex encode (to some degree) a signal that correlates
with decision value. This was elegantly demonstrated by Roesch
and Olson (2003) who recorded from multiple brain areas span-
ning both the prefrontal and premotor cortices and found that the
encoding of reward value was most commonly found in premotor
areas. What was notable about this finding was that damage to
premotor cortex does not typically induce decision-making deficits
per se. This emphasized that importance of having converging
evidence from both correlative and interference techniques when
trying to infer function. Moreover, this study highlighted that
processes such as attention, arousal, motivation, or motor prepa-
ration all strongly correlate with value, meaning that it is seldom
straightforward to determine whether neurons are actually encod-
ing the subjective value of a decision or instead some other related
variable (Roesch & Olson, 2007). We now know that value signals
are in fact a ubiquitous signal in the brain, evident not just in PFC
areas, but also in amygdala, striatum, premotor, parietal, posterior
cingulate, and visual areas to name a few (McCoy, Crowley,
Haghighian, Dean, & Platt, 2003; Paton, Belova, Morrison, &
Salzman, 2006; Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Roesch & Olson, 2003;
Shuler & Bear, 2006).
So we are now at a new junction; neuropsychological studies
suggest decision making occurs in the PFC yet neurophysiological
studies implicated almost the whole brain in representing a value
signal. How do we reconcile the findings from these different
methodologies and how do we determine if different brain areas
support specialized functions in decision-making? The strategy
that we have used in the current review is to try to find converging
evidence from studies using neurophysiological and neuropsycho-
logical techniques in the same frontal lobe areas to address the
issue of functional specialization among PFC areas. The former
has unique spatial and temporal resolution, thus allowing us to
identify not only in which value is represented, but also at what
time course, how it changes with learning or behavioral state, and
the encoding scheme in which value is represented. This is par-
ticularly important in PFC because many neurons encode value
with opposing encoding schemes that when averaged across pop-
ulations of neurons (e.g., functional MRI and event-related poten-
tials) might not be detected (cf. Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, &
Wallis, 2009). The latter methodology provides a powerful tool to
draw causal inferences between physiology and behavior and
allows us to address the question of the “functional importance” of
a value representation. Indeed, as will become clear below, it is
notable that restricted frontal lobe lesions often cause surprisingly
selective impairments in value-based decision making, suggesting
that these regions may only be required for a subset of such
choices. As focal lesions of single PFC regions are relatively rare
in humans, we mainly concentrate on the effects of circumscribed
lesions of specific regions of ACC and OFC in animal models.
Our review is necessarily not an exhaustive survey of the whole
of PFC. This is partly due to the fact that we have very little
evidence of the “reward” functions of some PFC areas based on
neurophysiology and lesions studies. For example, there have been
few recording studies to date in areas 9, 10, 14, 32, and 25 (cf.
Bouret & Richmond, 2010; Rolls, Inoue, & Browning, 2003;
Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2010), sometimes for methodolog-
ical reasons (Mitz, Tsujimoto, Maclarty, & Wise, 2009), and
selective lesions that include these regions are also rare (cf. Buck-
ley et al., 2009; Piekema, Browning, & Buckley, 2009). We also
do not give as much attention to the neuroimaging literature as it
deserves, and instead direct the interested reader toward reviews
on this topic (e.g., Knutson & Wimmer, 2007; O’Doherty, Hamp-
ton, & Kim, 2007; Rangel & Hare, 2010). Instead, we review
ACC, LPFC, and OFC function based on single neuron electro-
physiology and focal lesion studies and attempt to place these
functions into recent frameworks of decision making.
We use an anatomical nomenclature to help synthesize results
across studies and techniques. In ACC, we largely focus on the
cingulate sulcus as this is the area in which most neurophysiolog-
ical recordings have taken place. There is some confusion about
the classification of the more rostral aspect of the dorsal bank of
the ACC sulcus, stemming partly from the fact that early anatom-
ical diagrams labeled this region as 24c or did not include a label
(Devinsky & Lucuano, 1993; Dum & Strick, 1996; He, Dum, &
Strick, 1995; Rizzolatti, Luppino, & Matelli, 1996). More recent
anatomical studies classify the dorsal bank of the ACC sulcus as
area 9v and part of the PFC, whereas the ACC begins in the ventral
bank of the cingulate sulcus and includes areas 24, 25, and 32 of
the cingulate gyrus (Vogt, Vogt, Farber, & Bush, 2005). However,
we include studies that have recorded from or lesioned the dorsal
bank of the cingulate sulcus in our ACC nomenclature, even
though they may include parts of areas 9 and 6. For simplicity,
OFC will largely be taken together as areas 11, 13, and 14, despite
recent evidence that there may be functional differences between
lateral OFC and medial OFC/VMPFC regions (Bouret & Rich-
mond, 2010; Noonan et al., 2010). LPFC will include studies of
areas 9, 46, and 45 (Petrides & Pandya, 2002). To aid cross-species
comparisons, we use the above common nomenclature to describe
studies in both primates and rodents, as there is functional and
anatomical evidence that rodent OFC, infralimbic and prelimbic
cortex (often termed together as medial frontal cortex), and ACC
may be functionally equivalent to agranular parts of OFC (poste-
rior parts of areas 14 and 13), subgenual ACC (area 25), rostral
ACC (pregenual area 32), and dorsal ACC (dorsal area 24), re-
spectively in primates (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010; Rushworth,
Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Wise, 2008). However, it
is important to note that there may not be clear homologues of primate
granular frontal lobe regions in the rodent brain, many of which are
the targets of lesion and recording studies that we discuss.
A Decision-Making Framework for Understanding
Frontal Lobe Functions
Many neurons in the brain are modulated by the value of an
outcome. On the one hand, this is very interesting because such a
signal might contribute to the process of decision making. How-
ever, which decision-making process? Many of the decisions that
humans and animals face on a daily basis require a consideration
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effects on the neural representation of value in a particular brain
region. Even the routine decision of where to shop (or forage) for
food is likely to be influenced by a number of disparate factors.
First, humans and animals might evaluate their current internal
state (thirst/appetite); the decision whether to expend energy for-
aging for food will be influenced by one’s current (or future)
nutrition needs. Assuming dietary resources are desired, one’s choice
in food might be influenced by how hungry you are (how much
should I eat?), what type of food you currently prefer (which is likely
to be influenced by your recent history of food choices), what your
goals are (save money, eat less/healthy, explore new foraging envi-
ronments), nonphysical costs associated with each food option (e.g.,
uncertainty of how palatable the food may be, delay before food will
be obtained, potential risks), and physical costs, such as the energy
that must be expended to obtain food. And the choices we make today
may differ substantially from the ones we made yesterday (or tomor-
row), as our current needs and goals change and as we learn from the
choices we have made in the past. Thus, optimal decision making is
likely to rest on a number of valuation processes and it is critical that
we develop a framework of possible valuation processes so that we
can begin to identify the unique functional roles different areas con-
tribute to decision making.
Recently, Rangel and colleagues (Rangel, Camerer, & Mon-
tague, 2008; Rangel & Hare, 2010) devised just such a framework
of decision making that highlights several processes necessary for
optimal goal-directed choice. First, the brain needs to represent
what alternatives are available and determine the current and
predicted future internal state (e.g., hunger level, subjective pref-
erence) that may inform the valuation of those alternatives. Sec-
ond, given these states, the brain must then evaluate the external
variables that will influence the value of the outcome (e.g., risk,
probability, delay). Third, the brain needs to determine the value of
the action that would obtain the different outcomes, and discount
the outcome based on the expected physical costs (e.g., effort).
Optimal selection would then be based on comparison of these
action values. Finally, once the choice has been made the brain
must compute the value of the obtained outcome. Depending on
whether the obtained outcome matched the predicted value of that
alternative, a prediction error signal can be generated to modify the
value of the alternatives thereby ensuring that future choices are
adaptive. Although some of the functions associated with ACC,
LPFC and OFC cannot necessarily be ascribed to any single level in
this framework (e.g., the role of OFC in reversal learning), we use this
framework as a general guide to describe the specialized (or nonspe-
cialized) contributions of ACC, LPFC, and OFC in decision-making
processes. It should be noted that we are largely focusing on goal-
directed types of behavior in our discussion of PFC function. How-
ever, there are likely several other influences on choices such as from
habitual stimulus-response or Pavlovian associations, which we will
not consider in this review (see Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010 or
Rangel et al., 2008, for further discussion of the role of multiple-
valuation systems during decision making).
Representation of Internal States
Representation of Incentive Value
Arguably the starting point of any decision for an organism is an
evaluation of its internal needs given the current state of the
environment, as well as an evaluation of what outcomes might
satisfy those needs. These parameters are present implicitly in
almost all behavioral experiments as most tasks with animals and
many with humans involve an element of incentive to motivate the
subjects to attend and work. In the case of decision making, the
requirement to use reward as a reinforcer has been exploited to
allow investigators to probe i) how humans and animals make
choices to satisfy internal needs, such as metabolic state, ii) how
value is represented (whether outcome specific or as an abstract
“cached” value) and, iii) how these parameters can be incorporated
into models of the computation of value (Doya, 2008; Rangel et
al., 2008). Several studies have shown that neuronal activity in
OFC (Critchley & Rolls, 1996; Nakano et al., 1984; Rolls, Critch-
ley, Browning, Hernadi, & Lenard, 1999; Rolls et al., 1989) and
VMPFC (Bouret & Richmond, 2010) changes as subjects become
sated, possibly implemented through interactions with the lateral
hypothalamus (de Araujo et al., 2006; Floyd, Price, Ferry, Keay, &
Bandler, 2001; Ongur, An, & Price, 1998).
The OFC is also closely connected with regions such as the
anterior insula and frontal operculum that receive inputs from
gustatory-responsive parts of the thalamus, and has been proposed
to contain an area of secondary taste cortex in caudolateral OFC
(Cavada, Company, Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo, & Reinoso-Suarez,
2000; Rolls et al., 1990). Thus OFC is in a particularly strong
anatomical position to evaluate the incentive value, or preference,
of different rewards. Studies that manipulate gustatory rewards
have found encoding of these rewards within OFC (Lara, Kenner-
ley, & Wallis, 2009; Rolls, 2000; Rolls et al., 1990), which often
reflects a preference ranking of different rewards (Hikosaka &
Watanabe, 2000, 2004; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999) and the com-
bination of reward preference and magnitude (Padoa-Schioppa &
Assad, 2006, 2008). Damage to OFC and VMPFC impairs the
ability to establish relative and consistent preferences when of-
fered novel foods (Baylis & Gaffan, 1991), and humans with OFC
and VMPFC damage show inconsistent preferences (Fellows &
Farah, 2007). Interestingly however, in a task that required the
animal to remember the sensory characteristics and identity of
different rewards across delays to make a subsequent discrimina-
tion (rather than use reward preference to guide decision making),
we found little evidence that OFC neurons encoded reward pref-
erence (Lara et al., 2009). This emphasizes a common feature of
PFC function; that behavioral context often influences the type of
information encoded to facilitate flexible behavior (Kennerley &
Wallis, 2009c; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Rainer, Asaad, & Miller,
1998; Wallis & Kennerley, 2010).
Both medial and lateral parts of OFC, along with the ACC and
subcortical regions such as the amygdala and ventral striatum, also
seem to carry representations of the qualities of foods such as the
texture, temperature, and flavor (Rolls, 2010). Although there is
some evidence that LPFC (Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000; Wa-
tanabe, 1996) and ACC (Luk & Wallis, 2009) neurons also encode
gustatory rewards as if encoding reward preference, the OFC may
have a specialized role in encoding the incentive value of a reward,
especially with respect to current internal state.
Adaptive Coding of Incentive Value
OFC therefore has a potentially rich representation of the in-
centive value of an anticipated outcome associated with predictive
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natural environment and the limited firing range of neurons (typ-
ically  50 Hz), a question then arises is how such information is
encoded to allow appropriate decisions to be taken. One solution
would be to have a contextually based relative valuation scale.
Some OFC neurons—particularly in area 13—have been shown to
adjust their firing rate to the range of values offered (Kobayashi,
Pinto de Carvalho, & Schultz, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Trem-
blay & Schultz, 1999). Such adaptive coding is efficient because it
allows for maximum discrimination between each distribution of
possible outcomes, and it allows flexibility to encode values across
decision contexts that may differ substantially in value (e.g., a
choice between dinner entrees on a menu compared to a choice of
what type of car to buy).
However, it is also important not simply to judge value based on
relative context. Interestingly, the majority of outcome sensitive
OFC neurons actually do not adapt their firing rates to the range
(or type) of outcomes available, instead encoding value on a fixed
scale (Kobayashi et al., 2010; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008).
The fact that some OFC neurons are not range adaptive and thus
are invariant to the set of offers available indicates value transi-
tivity, a key characteristic of economic choice (Padoa-Schioppa &
Assad, 2008). Thus, as a population, OFC expresses both range
adaptation and value transitivity, indicating two fundamental traits
necessary for optimal choice. Although some evidence suggests
that ACC neurons may adapt their firing rate depending on the
distribution of values available (Hillman & Bilkey, 2010; Sallet et
al., 2007), reports of range adaptation in single neurons have
typically focused either on OFC or areas outside of frontal cortex,
such as parts of the striatum and midbrain dopaminergic nuclei
(Cromwell, Hassani, & Schultz, 2005; Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz,
2005). It therefore remains an open question whether range adap-
tation in frontal cortex is a unique trait of OFC neurons. However,
neuroimaging studies have shown relative value activation in ACC
(Coricelli et al., 2005; Fujiwara, Tobler, Taira, Iijima, & Tsutsui,
2009) and LPFC (Coricelli et al., 2005; Fujiwara et al., 2009;
Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague, 2007).
Updating Value Representations Through Internal
State-Based Manipulations
One of the cardinal tasks employed to demonstrate how changes
in internal states modify the values of potential appetitive out-
comes is one known as reinforcer devaluation (Holland & Straub,
1979). Subjects are taught that one of two distinct reward types
(i.e., peanuts or chocolate) is associated with particular neutral
objects or can only be obtained by making particular actions.
Following this training, one of the rewards is “devalued,” either by
feeding of the reward to satiety or by pairing the reward with
chemically induced illness. Subsequently, in a test session, sub-
jects are presented with pairs of options, one associated with the
receipt of each reward type, meaning that they have to make their
decisions based on the updated values of the expected outcomes
prior to re-experiencing the outcomes (i.e., the decision is goal
directed). It has been suggested that this type of decision may not
simply be guided by change in the incentive value of the outcome,
however, but may also be influenced by the contingent link be-
tween a stimulus and a particular outcome type (Ostlund & Bal-
leine, 2007a).
In a stimulus-based version of this task, both rats and monkeys
with damage to OFC (but not to LPFC or VMPFC) continued to
select the option associated with the devalued reward (Baxter et
al., 2008; Baxter, Gaffan, Kyriazis, & Mitchell, 2009; Gallagher,
McMahan, & Schoenbaum, 1999; Izquierdo, Suda, & Murray,
2004; Pickens et al., 2003). This is true whether lesions were made
prior to initial stimulus-outcome training or following training.
Importantly, this impairment is only present when selecting be-
tween objects associated with the devalued reward, rather than
when selecting between the two foods directly (Izquierdo et al.,
2004). These findings suggest OFC, in conjunction with the
amygdala (Baxter, Parker, Lindner, Izquierdo, & Murray, 2000),
has an important role in updating stimulus-outcome associations
based on current internal state. However, it has been shown in
rodents that OFC was not required for appropriate state-based
decision making when choices were guided by associations with
particular actions (Ostlund & Balleine, 2007b). Instead, only le-
sions to prelimbic cortex affect response-based reinforcer devalu-
ation, although only if lesions were made prior to training on the
response-outcome associations and not if these associations have
already been learned prior to surgery (Ostlund & Balleine, 2005).
Schoenbaum and colleagues (Schoenbaum, Roesch, Stalnaker,
& Takahashi, 2009) used such evidence, along with that from a
series of their own elegant recording and interference studies in
rodents, to present a strong case that the main function of OFC was
to signal specific stimulus-based outcome expectancies. Without
such associative representations, they argued, it was not possible to
generate appropriate error signals following breaks of expectation
to guide learning.
Representation of External Variables That Influence
Outcome Value
Encoding of Decision Variables That Determine
Expected Value
A decision’s expected value is not only based on one’s internal
state, but also on a number of variables that influence that value of
the expected outcome. It is important to distinguish neurons that
encode information about “expected” outcomes from neurons that
encode information after the actual outcome has been received.
The former may contribute to the process of making the current
decision, whereas the latter signal may have multiple functions,
which will be addressed in later sections of this review. Impor-
tantly, these two representations often occur in very close temporal
proximity (i.e., 1 s) around outcome onset, thus it is important to
have methodological techniques that can distinguish between these
two representations. Although we showed that some of the same
PFC neurons encode information about decision variables (e.g.,
reward size) at the time of choice (i.e., prior to outcome onset) and
at the time of the experienced outcome (Kennerley et al., 2009;
Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b), this also is clearly not the case for
many PFC neurons. Thus, it is not simply what value information
is encoded (i.e., reward size) but rather when that value informa-
tion is encoded (pre- or post-outcome) that reflects the type of
valuation process represented by different neurons.
At first glance it would appear as though there is no particular
specialization within PFC for the encoding of decision value.
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ACC, LPFC, and OFC—are modulated by almost every decision
variable investigators have used to manipulate the expected value
of an outcome. Neurons in these frontal areas are sensitive to
sensory cues that indicate the presence, size and/or probability of
an expected positive or negative outcome (Amiez, Joseph, &
Procyk, 2006; Hosokawa, Kato, Inoue, & Mikami, 2007; Kenner-
ley et al., 2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009a; Kennerley & Wallis,
2009c; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2010; Morrison &
Salzman, 2009; O’Neill & Schultz, 2010; Roesch & Olson, 2003;
Roesch & Olson, 2004; Rolls, 2000; Sallet et al., 2007; Schoen-
baum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 1998; Seo & Lee, 2009; Wallis &
Miller, 2003; Watanabe, Hikosaka, Sakagami, & Shirakawa,
2002), size and temporal proximity to reward (Kim, Hwang, &
Lee, 2008; Roesch & Olson, 2005; Roesch, Taylor, & Schoen-
baum, 2006), reward preference (Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000;
Luk & Wallis, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006, 2008; Trem-
blay & Schultz, 1999; Watanabe et al., 2002), effort required to
harvest reward (Hillman & Bilkey, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2009),
and one’s confidence in the choice outcome (Kepecs, Uchida,
Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008). This ubiquity of value coding across
different brain areas has not only made it difficult to understand
the specialized functions of different PFC areas (Wallis & Ken-
nerley, 2010) but also has raised speculation that value coding in
some brain areas may represent other functions beyond contribut-
ing to the decision-making process.
With respect to single neuron electrophysiology studies, the
overlap of these signals across frontal areas highlights the diffi-
culty in inferring functional specialization by comparing across
studies. For example, neurons in ACC, LPFC, and OFC all encode
reward magnitude but it is very difficult to infer a functional
hierarchy by simply comparing which area has more neurons that
encode reward magnitude because different investigators use dif-
ferent paradigms, record activity in different training or behavioral
states and often use very different analytical methods.
One resolution to this issue is to examine the activity of neurons
in multiple-brain areas simultaneously. We (Kennerley et al.,
2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b) designed an experiment with
the precise goal of determining whether neurons in different fron-
tal areas exhibit preferences for encoding different variables re-
lated to a decision’s value (Figure 1A, B). Monkeys were trained
to make choices based on conditioned stimuli that indicated dif-
ferent behavioral outcomes that varied in terms of either reward
probability, reward magnitude, or physical effort (Kennerley et al.,
2009). We recorded from OFC, ACC, and LPFC simultaneously,
thus allowing us to directly pit these three frontal areas against
each other in animals in the same behavioral state using the same
analytical methods. We found that neurons encoded value across
the different decision variables in diverse ways. For example,
some neurons encoded the value of just a single decision variable,
others encoded the value of choices for two of the variables but not
the third, while still others encoded value across all three decision
variables (Figure 1C, D). We found no evidence that any of the
three frontal areas were specialized for encoding any particular
decision variable (Figure 1E). Instead we found that ACC was
significantly more likely to encode the value of any of the decision
variables (Figure 1E), and significantly more likely to encode two
or three decision variables when compared to either LPFC or OFC
(Figure 1F). Thus, single ACC neurons are capable of encoding the
value of multiple-decision variables across trials, a type of multi-
plexed value representation that may allow the integration of the
individual components of a decision into a common value signal
(see The Encoding of Action Value section for further discussion
on this topic) and underlie ACC’s critical contribution to decision
making.
Reward Modulation of Cognitive Processes
Thus far we argued that the evidence from both neurophysio-
logical and neuropsychological studies implicates both the OFC
and ACC in the representation of reward to guide decision making.
Although the encoding of reward in many areas is likely to
reflect a role in guiding decision making, neuronal encoding of
reward also may reflect a change in attentional processes, rather
than reward coding per se, because one is likely to direct attention
to features or locations predictive of greater reward (Bendiksby &
Platt, 2006; Maunsell, 2004). A possible candidate for the encod-
ing of reward to influence attention is LPFC, as this area of PFC
has a role in a number of executive control processes including
working memory, strategy implementation, shifts of attention,
representation of rules/categories/objects, and response inhibition
among other functions (for detailed reviews, see Mansouri,
Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 2005;
Tanji & Hoshi, 2008; Wise, 2008). However evidence from both
neurophysiological and neuropsychological studies argues that
rather than simply maintaining information in working memory
(which could potentially be subserved by sensory areas) the crucial
role of LPFC appears to be guiding attentional processes of be-
havioral relevance (Buckley et al., 2009; Fellows & Farah, 2005;
Lebedev, Messinger, Kralik, & Wise, 2004; Mansouri, Buckley, &
Tanaka, 2007; Petrides, 2000; Rushworth, Nixon, Eacott, & Pass-
ingham, 1997; Wise, 2008), which includes the representation of
value (Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000; Kim et al., 2008; Roesch &
Olson, 2003; Seo, Barraclough, & Lee, 2007; Seo & Lee, 2009;
Wallis & Miller, 2003). Yet, LPFC lesions do not appear to cause
severe decision-making deficits, thus it remains unclear how re-
ward representations in LPFC contribute to goal-directed behavior.
One possibility we tested is that value encoding in LPFC reflects
a mechanism of prioritization of behaviorally relevant information
(Wallis & Kennerley, 2010). Our logic was twofold. First, we
know that cognitive processes have capacity constraints (e.g., the
limit and precision of information stored in working memory;
Bays & Husain, 2008), so there must be a mechanism by which the
brain allocates these resources in an efficient and behaviorally
relevant manner. Second, it is commonly known that increasing
the reward/value of an outcome improves behavioral performance
(Roesch & Olson, 2007). Given LPFC neurons encode information
about the direction of attention that can be held in working mem-
ory (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Lebedev et al.,
2004; Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997) and performance improves
when a subject expects a larger reward, we reasoned that increas-
ing reward might provide a means of directing attentional re-
sources to effectively modulate the fidelity of goal-relevant infor-
mation, thereby improving behavioral performance.
To examine this, we trained monkeys to attend to spatial loca-
tions and to maintain this information in working memory (Ken-
nerley & Wallis, 2009a; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009c). On each
trial, a picture informed the subject how much juice they would
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ever, in one set of trials (see Figure 2), the reward cue was
presented before the spatial cue (RS) and in the other set of trials
the spatial cue was presented before the reward cue (SR), allowing
us to compare the effects of reward on the spatial tuning of neurons
both independently and conjointly. Figure 2 illustrates an example
of reward modulating the spatial selectivity of a LPFC neuron. We
recorded from neurons in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), OFC, and ACC. Many
neurons in VLPFC, OFC, and ACC (but not DLPFC) encoded
Figure 1. Single neurons encode value and actions in a multivariable decision-making task. (A) Subjects made
choices between pairs of presented pictures. (B) There were six sets of pictures, each associated with a specific
outcome. We varied the value of the outcome by manipulating either the amount of reward the subject would
receive (payoff), the likelihood of receiving a reward (probability) or the number of times the subject had to press
a level to earn the reward (effort). We manipulated one parameter at time, holding the other two fixed. Presented
pictures were always adjacent to one another in terms of value, that is, choices were 1 versus 2, 2 versus 3, 3
versus 4 or 4 versus 5. (C and D) Spike density histograms illustrating the activity recorded from single neurons
under three different types of value manipulation (probability, payoff, or effort). The vertical lines indicate the
onset of the pictures indicating the value of the choice (left) and the time at which the animal was able to make
his choice (right). The different colored lines indicate the value of the choice under consideration or which action
the subject would select. (C) Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) neuron encodes payoff and effort but not
probability. (D) ACC neuron encodes the value and action of all three decision variables. (E) Percentage of all
neurons selective for value for each decision variable. All variables are predominately coded in ACC. (F)
Percentage of all neurons selective for value as a function of number of decision variables encoded. ACC
neurons tend to multiplex decision value across two (as in C) and three (as in D) decision variables. (G)
Percentage of all neurons selective for action for each decision variable. Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) neurons are
less likely to encode action information relative to lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and ACC. 
2 test,
 p  .05.
From “Neurons in the Frontal Lobe Encode the Value of Multiple Decision Variables,” by S. W. Kennerley,
A. F. Dahmubed, A. H. Lara, and J. D. Wallis, 2009, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, p. 1164, Figure 1.
Copyright 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Adapted with permission.
302 KENNERLEY AND WALTONFigure 2. The influence of reward on spatial tuning in a delayed response task. (A) In the reward-space (RS) task,
the subject sees two cues separated by a delay. The first cue indicates the amount of juice to expect for successful
performance of the task, and the second cue indicates the location the subject must maintain in spatial working
memory. The subject indicates his response by making a saccade to the location of the mnemonic cue 1 s later. The
fixation cue changes to yellow to tell the subject to initiate his saccade. The space-reward (SR) task is identical except
the cues appear in the opposite order. There are five different reward amounts, each predicted by one of two cues, and
24 spatial locations. (B and C) Spike density histograms of single neurons illustrating how the size of an expected
reward can modulate spatial tuning of information held in working memory. The graphs illustrate neuronal activity
as animals remember different locations on a computer screen under the expectancy of receiving either a small or a
large reward for correct performance. The gray bar indicates the presentation of the mnemonic spatial cue. To enable
clear visualization, the spatial data is collapsed into four groups consisting of six of the 24 possible spatial locations
tested. The inset indicates the mean standardized firing rate of the neuron across the 24 spatial locations. (B) When
the subject expected a small reward, the neuron showed little spatial selectivity, which consisted of an increase in
firing rate when the subject was remembering locations in the top left of the screen. When the subject expected a large
reward for correct performance, spatial selectivity dramatically increased with a high firing rate for locations in the
top left of the screen and a low firing rate for locations in the bottom right. Spatial selectivity was primarily evident
only during cue presentation. (C) A neuron that showed moderate spatial selectivity when the subject expected a small
reward, but a dramatic increase in spatial selectivity for targets in the top right when the subject expected a large
reward. This reward modulation of spatial selectivity persisted into the delay period, indicating a reward modulation
of the information contained in working memory. Panel A from “Reward-Dependent Modulation of Working
Memory in Lateral Prefrontal Cortex,” by S. W. Kennerley and J. D. Wallis, 2009, Journal of Neuroscience, 29, p.
3260, Figure 1, Copyright 2009 by S. W. Kennerley. Adapted with permission. Panel B from “Reward-Dependent
Modulation of Working Memory in Lateral Prefrontal Cortex,” by S. W. Kennerley and J. D. Wallis, 2009, Journal
of Neuroscience, 29, p. 3266, Figure 6, Copyright 2009 by S. W. Kennerley. Adapted with permission. Panel C from
“Heterogeneous Reward Signals in Prefrontal Cortex,” by J. D. Wallis and S. W. Kennerley, 2010, Current Opinion
in Neurobiology, 20, p. 194, Figure 3, Copyright 2010 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission.
303 DECISION MAKING AND REWARD IN FRONTAL CORTEXreward information, but spatial information was predominantly
encoded in VLPFC. Moreover, reward information was encoded
earlier in OFC and VLPFC than in ACC and DLPFC, consistent
with previous reports that OFC was one of the initial PFC areas to
represent the rewarding value predicted by a conditioned stimulus
(Kennerley & Wallis, 2009a; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009c; Wallis
& Miller, 2003). Importantly, although some neurons exhibited a
change in spatial tuning as a function of reward, these neurons
were only found in VLPFC (Kennerley & Wallis, 2009c). This is
consistent with previous reports that have failed to find strong
evidence that reward shapes the direction of attention in neurons in
DLPFC, frontal eye field, or premotor cortex (Leon & Shadlen,
1999; Roesch & Olson, 2003), although recent evidence suggests
the supplementary eye field may play some role in this function
(So & Stuphorn, 2010).
While only VLPFC neurons exhibited a reward-dependent mod-
ulation of spatial selectivity, the behavioral performance of the
animals in the two different sets of trials indicated that the encod-
ing of reward in VLPFC neurons reflected an attentional - rather
than reward - function; larger expected reward led to increased
behavioral performance and increased spatial selectivity when the
reward cue was presented before the spatial cue, but decreased
spatial selectivity and no improvement in performance when the
reward cue was presented after the spatial cue. This suggested that
the reward cue competes for limited attentional resources, inter-
fering with ongoing spatial attention processes that are attempting
to maintain the location of the peripherally presented mnemonic
cue (Awh & Jonides, 2001; Duncan, 2001). This interpretation of
our results also is compatible with recent results from neurophys-
iology (Lebedev et al., 2004) and neuropsychology (Rushworth et
al., 2005) studies that suggest a primary role for VLPFC in
attentional control, and are consistent with the idea that VLPFC is
important for the maintenance of task relevant information and the
filtering of irrelevant information (Petrides, 1996).
Reward-dependent modulation of cognitive resources is not
limited to spatial attention; reward can also modulate LPFC en-
coding of high-level information, such as categories (Pan, Sawa,
Tsuda, Tsukada, & Sakagami, 2008). Furthermore, the modulation
may be bidirectional: Attentional allocation also may modulate the
reward signal based on behavioral goals. In dieters exercising
self-control regarding choices involving healthy and unhealthy
foods, increased LPFC activation is associated with a concomitant
decrease in areas representing value information (e.g., OFC), as
though LPFC is dampening the value signal (Hare, Camerer, &
Rangel, 2009).
The Encoding of Action Value
Representing the Action Costs of a Decision
Most studies of decision making have tended to focus on vari-
ables that influence the rewarding value of an outcome, such as
variables like magnitude, probability, and delay as discussed
above. However, in natural environments, the distance and terrain
that one might encounter in obtaining food (or traveling to work)
produces energetic costs (e.g., effort), which is a critical compo-
nent in optimal choice (Rangel & Hare, 2010; Stephens & Krebs,
1986; Stevens, Rosati, Ross, & Hauser, 2005; Walton, Kennerley,
Bannerman, Phillips, & Rushworth, 2006). Growing evidence sug-
gests that ACC may have a specialized role in influencing effort-
based decision making. Damage to ACC biases animals toward
actions that are associated with less effort even when a more
rewarding option is available (Floresco & Ghods-Sharifi, 2007;
Schweimer & Hauber, 2005; Walton, Bannerman, Alterescu, &
Rushworth, 2003; Walton, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 2002). In
contrast, OFC lesions impair delay-based decision making, but not
effort-based decision making (Rudebeck, Walton, Smyth, Banner-
man, & Rushworth, 2006).
Relative to reward processing, very few studies have directly
manipulated physical effort while recording the activity of frontal
neurons. Neurons in ACC increase their activity as monkeys work
through multiple actions toward reward (Shidara & Richmond,
2002). Although neurons in ACC are significantly more likely to
encode effort than neurons in LPFC or OFC, this is also true for the
reward variables as seen in Figure 1E (Kennerley et al., 2009;
Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b). Thus, although ACC may have a
specialized role in encoding effort costs, this may be part of its
broader role in integrating the costs and benefits of a choice option
in the determination of which action is optimal.
Nonetheless, the precise role of these regions in allowing ani-
mals to overcome such costs is not yet fully understood. For
example, despite the finding that when given a choice option that
would minimize effort or delay, ACC and OFC lesions make
animals effort- or delay-cost averse, respectively (Rudebeck, Wal-
ton, et al., 2006; Walton et al., 2002). Yet, damage to either region
has no effect on an animal’s basic willingness to work or tolerate
delays for reward when there are no other potential rewarding
alternatives, as shown by normal performance in progressive ratio
tests that require animals to work progressively harder and wait
progressively longer for reward (Baxter et al., 2000; Izquierdo et
al., 2004; Pears, Parkinson, Hopewell, Everitt, & Roberts, 2003).
This implies that neither ACC nor OFC encodes a generalized
motivational signal that drives behavior in all contexts. Instead, as
we will discuss in later sections, these effects likely reflect more
general roles for ACC and OFC for maintaining and updating
outcome expectancies associated with either actions or stimuli
respectively, especially in situations where outcomes are separated
from choices either in terms of action steps or in time (Rushworth
& Behrens, 2008; Schoenbaum et al., 2009).
Integration or Specialization of Decision Variable
Representations
Despite the variety of decision alternatives available in any
given moment, the brain must somehow determine which option
best meets our current needs and goals. Although some decisions
can be evaluated using objective measures along a single dimen-
sion (e.g., choosing between identical items that differ only by
their price), many of the decisions humans and animals face have
incommensurate consequences (e.g., should I spend my extra
money on a much needed vacation, or should I spend that money
on much needed home repairs). In these latter two examples there
is no straightforward way to compare the outcomes because each
decision is associated with very different benefits.
Formal decision models suggest that the determination of an
action’s overall value rests on the integration of both the costs and
benefits of a decision, thus generating a single value estimate for
each decision alternative (Montague & Berns, 2002; Rangel &
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as a type of neuronal currency—equivalent to net utility in eco-
nomic terms—which can then be used to compare very disparate
outcomes (Montague & Berns, 2002). An abstract value signal
would be computational efficient as it would allow optimal choice
by simple identification of the outcome with the maximal value.
However, such a system operating in isolation would make learn-
ing about individual decision variables problematic, as it would not
be possible to update our estimates of the contribution of, for
example, the effort costs in isolation of reward benefits, if the only
signal an organism received was in terms of overall utility.
Whether a brain area is capable of integrating value across
decision variables is a topic of great interest. However, it is
important to draw distinctions between a neuron (or voxel) that
encodes two different decision variables when tested indepen-
dently (or across studies) and a neuron that encodes the sum or
difference of the two variables when they are assessed conjointly
in the same testing session (integration). The former case can
inform whether a region is capable of encoding the components
necessary to form an integrated value signal, whereas only the
latter case describes whether a single neuron can integrate across
decision variables. Nonetheless, at the population level, we know
areas of the frontal cortex—especially ACC and OFC—are par-
ticularly good candidates for representing multiple (or integrating
across) decision variables because damage here impairs decisions
that require a consideration of multiple decision variables (Amiez
et al., 2006; Bechara et al., 1994; Fellows, 2006; Fellows & Farah,
2005; Rudebeck et al., 2008; Rudebeck, Buckley, Walton, &
Rushworth, 2006; Walton, Behrens, Buckley, Rudebeck, & Rush-
worth, 2010; Walton et al., 2006).
At the level of single neurons, some neurons in ACC, LPFC, and
OFC appear to integrate across decision variables. OFC neurons
integrate reward preference and magnitude as if reflecting the
economic value of the different “goods” or outcomes available
(Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006, 2008). OFC neurons are sensi-
tive to both reward size and delay (Roesch & Olson, 2005) or
positive and negative events (Hosokawa et al., 2007; Morrison &
Salzman, 2009; Rolls, 2000) as if coding value on a common scale.
In ACC, neurons integrate both size and probability of reward
(Amiez et al., 2006; Sallet et al., 2007), multiplex reward size and
probability with effort cost (Kennerley et al., 2009) and integrate
both the costs and benefits of a decision indicative of net value
(Hillman & Bilkey, 2010). Neurons in LPFC encode both positive
and negative events (Kobayashi et al., 2006) and integrate reward
and delay information to form a temporally discounted value
signal (Kim et al., 2008).
However, for some OFC neurons, variables such as size and
delay to reward (Roesch et al., 2006), risk and reward size (O’Neill
& Schultz, 2010), or rewarding and aversive events (Morrison &
Salzman, 2009), are encoded by largely separate populations of
neurons. It should be noted however that in many studies, different
decision variables have been examined independently (i.e., only a
single decision variable was examined within a trial). Thus, dif-
ferences in the degree in which neurons encode multiple decision
variables or integrate across variables might depend on the task
requirements. Nonetheless, one interpretation of these results is
that many OFC neurons encode individual value parameters asso-
ciated with a stimulus (as opposed to an abstract value signal)
because this representation is key for learning and representing
why a particular decision option is valuable (see above). If so,
these variable-specific neurons in OFC may have a more influen-
tial role in influencing the calculation of decision value and in
updating these individual parameters following discrepancies,
whereas neurons that encode an integrated representation of deci-
sion value might reflect the output of the decision process.
Linking Value to Action
Although neurons throughout the frontal cortex encode infor-
mation about the expected value of an outcome, how these neurons
influence action selection clearly differentiates frontal areas. Both
ACC and LPFC send projections to the premotor areas, whereas
OFC receives strong sensory input but weakly connects with motor
areas (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Cavada et al., 2000; Croxson et
al., 2005; Dum & Strick, 1993; Wang, Shima, Isoda, Sawamura, &
Tanji, 2002). Consistent with this anatomy, neurophysiological
studies have reported that ACC neurons tend to encode the value
of the outcome and the action that led to the outcome (Figure 1E,
1G; Hayden & Platt, 2010; Kennerley et al., 2009; Luk & Wallis,
2009; K. Matsumoto, Suzuki, & Tanaka, 2003), although studies
using eye movements also have found less prominent representa-
tion of actions than in adjacent dorsomedial prefrontal structures
(Seo & Lee, 2007, 2009; So & Stuphorn, 2010). LPFC neurons
also encode information about actions, but neurons here tend to
encode associations between the stimulus and action, whereas
ACC neurons preferentially encode information about the action
and outcome (Luk & Wallis, 2009; K. Matsumoto et al., 2003;
Wallis & Miller, 2003). In contrast, OFC neurons encode the value
of sensory stimuli with little encoding of motor responses (Ken-
nerley et al., 2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b; Morrison &
Salzman, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006, 2008; Wallis &
Miller, 2003). Some recent reports suggested that OFC neurons
may encode action information but typically after the action has
been performed and the outcome is experienced (Bouret & Rich-
mond, 2010; Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2009).
Few electrophysiology experiments to date have manipulated
only an action’s value. However, there is evidence that ACC
neurons detect changes in action value—or how preferable one
action is relative to another—to directly influence adaptive action
selection, but show less sensitivity to changes in value cued by
nonappetitive sensory stimuli (Luk & Wallis, 2009; M. Matsu-
moto, Matsumoto, Abe, & Tanaka, 2007; Shima & Tanji, 1998).
The Comparison of Action Values: Making a Choice
It may seem, after the computation of stimulus and action
values, that the process of making a decision itself should be
relatively straightforward, requiring a simple comparison of the
different integrated values of the available alternatives. However,
the role of frontal cortex neurons in allowing certain choices to be
made is arguably the least well-understood component of decision
making. As discussed above, there are multiple influences on the
value of an option, any of which might be influenced by external
factors such as rules or attention. Decision making is also not
simply a read out of current action values, but instead is a sto-
chastic process that likely uses something equivalent to a logistic
function to translate between available options and a selected
response (Rangel & Hare, 2010; Sutton & Barto, 1998). In some
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at all, actions instead being chosen via a decision policy (Fleming,
Thomas, & Dolan, 2010). Moreover, it is sometimes not clear at
what point a particular decision is made, given that the evidence
for a particular choice can be accumulated over a relatively large
number of trials and long time periods. There is increasing evi-
dence that persistent activity between and across trials may be
important for choice behavior (Curtis & Lee, 2010).
It has been argued that of all the frontal lobe regions, LPFC is
best placed to control and implement choice behavior through its
connections with parietal and premotor cortices as well as with
OFC and ACC (Kable & Glimcher, 2009). Some directionally
tuned cells in LPFC have been shown to dynamically increase their
firing rates during choices based on the integrated value of a target
presented within their preferred direction (Kim et al., 2008). Elec-
trophysiology studies have reported chosen value signals in OFC
(Kepecs et al., 2008; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Sul, Kim,
Huh, Lee, & Jung, 2010). Again, however, whether such signals
reflect the process of a decision or the readout from a comparison
process made elsewhere is a matter of debate.
Given the range of possible contributing sources of evidence to
be considered during a decision, one potentially important function
of the frontal lobe would be to focus attention on the variables
pertinent to the current decision. Patients with large lesions en-
compassing OFC and VMPFC alter the way in which they choose
to acquire information when making complex decisions, making
them prefer to compare all the attributes of a single available
option (in this case, an apartment) rather than evaluating across all
available options on an selected set of attributes (for instance, the
price or number of bedrooms; Fellows, 2006). Recently, Noonan
and colleagues (Noonan et al., 2010) showed that monkeys with
selective medial OFC lesions failed to choose the highest value
option in a three-armed bandit decision making task when the
value of the next best option was itself much greater than value of
the worst option. One interpretation of these data is that medial
OFC is required to focus attention on the relevant variables prior
to making a decision.
There have been a number of influential theoretical models to
explain how response selection might occur. These models typi-
cally describe a process by which sensory information about
potential actions “accumulate” and potentially compete until a
“threshold” is reached, at which point a response is selected (Beck
et al., 2008; Bogacz, 2007; Cisek, 2007; Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr,
2009; Gold & Shadlen, 2002; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010;
Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Wang,
2008). These models often explain the firing patterns of neurons in
the superior colliculus (Munoz & Wurtz, 1995; Ratcliff, Hase-
gawa, Hasegawa, Smith, & Segraves, 2007), the lateral intrapari-
etal area (Leon & Shadlen, 2003; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002), the
frontal eye fields (Gold & Shadlen, 2000; Gold & Shadlen, 2003),
the dorsal premotor cortex (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005), and the LPFC
(Kim & Shadlen, 1999).
However, in most cases, these models account for patterns of
activity in neurons which have defined receptive fields; in other
words, where the value of a decision is coded in an action frame
of reference. In contrast, as we described earlier, many neurons in
PFC encode aspects of decision value that are independent of an
action frame of reference, such as current motivational state or
preference for particular rewards. Moreover, even when particular
actions are associated with different value parameters (e.g., mag-
nitude of reward), many neurons in ACC, LPFC, and OFC encode
the value parameter without encoding any information about the
response, as if value is coded in “goods” rather than “action” space
(Kennerley et al., 2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009a; Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad, 2006, 2008; Seo & Lee, 2009; Wallis & Miller,
2003). Thus value coding in many PFC neurons lacks a clear frame
of reference for which to bias action selection. It therefore remains
a challenge to develop theoretical models to explain precisely how
effector independent value representations in areas like OFC and
ACC ultimately bias the accumulation of evidence in favor of
selecting a particular action.
The Encoding of Experienced Outcomes
The Encoding of Outcome Value
Within the frontal cortex, neurons are particularly sensitive to
the experienced outcome of a choice. Neurons in ACC, LPFC, and
OFC are modulated by the presence and absence of reward or to
unexpected outcomes (Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2005; Ito, Stu-
phorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b; Niki
& Watanabe, 1979; Quilodran, Rothe, & Procyk, 2008; Sallet et
al., 2007; Seo et al., 2007; Seo & Lee, 2007; Seo & Lee, 2009;
Simmons & Richmond, 2008; Tremblay & Schultz, 2000b; Wa-
tanabe, 1989; Watanabe et al., 2002) and by the experience of
different magnitudes or types of outcomes (Amiez et al., 2006;
Hikosaka & Watanabe, 2000; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b; Roesch
et al., 2006; Rolls, 2000; Rolls et al., 1990; Tremblay & Schultz,
1999; Watanabe, 1996).
We examined neuronal activity at the time of outcome in our
multivariate choice task and found that many frontal neurons
encoded reward presence, especially in ACC, in which approxi-
mately 60% of ACC neurons differentiated whether a trial was
rewarded (Kennerley & Wallis, 2009b). However, we found no
evidence that ACC neurons were simply detecting errors because
an approximately equal number of neurons increased firing rate
based on reward presence as increased firing rate to reward ab-
sence; rather, ACC neurons appeared to be encoding the value of
the outcome. Although we also found evidence that frontal neurons
encoded reward prediction errors (see below), the encoding of
reward presence/absence was much more common, as has been
reported in other studies (Amiez et al., 2006; M. Matsumoto et al.,
2007; Seo & Lee, 2007). Moreover, our results also suggest that an
explanation of outcome activity solely in terms of expectancy
violation or error monitoring is overly simplistic. Many of the
neurons that responded to the presence/absence of the reward
encoded other aspects of the outcome, such as the magnitude of the
reward and the physical effort necessary to earn the reward. This
suggests that for many frontal neurons, their role in outcome
evaluation generalizes across different types of outcomes rather
than being specific to monitoring for the presence of reward or
errors. Thus, frontal neurons contain a particularly rich represen-
tation of the behavioral outcome that is not necessarily simply
related to the received reward, but also why the reward is valuable.
Outcome information can also serve as feedback about the
relevance of a response or as a cue to guide future decisions.
Neurons in several frontal lobe regions are sensitive to feedback
indicating when a change in response is necessary to obtain a
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Everling, 2007; Mansouri et al., 2007; K. Matsumoto et al., 2003;
Wallis & Miller, 2003). In fact, in the majority of animal neuro-
science tasks, outcome value directly informs subsequent respond-
ing, meaning that the contribution of the value of a received
outcome and information obtained from such feedback cannot be
dissociated. One exception to this came in a series of studies
employing a instructed strategy task in which a cue on each trial
instructed the animal whether to switch from its previous required
response and therefore could not be solved using a reward-stay/no
reward-shift strategy (Tsujimoto et al., 2009; Tsujimoto et al.,
2010). At the time of the outcome, LPFC neurons encoded both the
response and whether it was rewarded, but OFC neurons only
carried information about what response had been chosen (Tsu-
jimoto et al., 2009). Such signals in OFC therefore appear not to be
representing outcome value per se, but instead a signal to indicate
the appropriateness of a choice.
Adaptive Decision Making
Reward Prediction Errors
Dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area and substantia
nigra have been suggested to encode a prediction error, which is
the discrepancy between a predicted and actual outcome (Bayer &
Glimcher, 2005; Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; M. Matsumoto
& Hikosaka, 2009; Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Roesch,
Calu, & Schoenbaum, 2007; Satoh, Nakai, Sato, & Kimura, 2003;
Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Tobler et al., 2005). The
frontal cortex is a major recipient of dopaminergic input (Berger,
Trottier, Verney, Gaspar, & Alvarez, 1988; Williams & Goldman-
Rakic, 1998), and several studies have shown that neurons in PFC,
especially within ACC, encode a type of reward prediction error
signal, although not necessarily qualitatively identical to the signal
evident in dopamine neurons. For example, in a task in which
monkeys have to learn which of two actions is the correct (re-
warded) action within a block of trials, many ACC (but fewer
LPFC) neurons responded to either positive or negative feedback,
especially on the first trial of a block (when the feedback is
particularly instructive as to which action to select on subsequent
trials). In some neurons, the magnitude of the neuronal response to
positive feedback decreased over the next few trials (as the animal
learned which action would be rewarded) in correlation with
decreases in the prediction error (M. Matsumoto et al., 2007). Yet,
although neurons in ACC encode a reward prediction error signal,
positive and negative prediction errors seem to be encoded by
largely separate populations of neurons. Other studies have iden-
tified neuronal activity in ACC that resembles a prediction error
(Amiez et al., 2005; Seo & Lee, 2007).
In contrast, most neurons in OFC do not exhibit a prediction
error signal. Instead, OFC neurons signal expected outcomes, as
OFC neurons exhibit the same response at the time of outcome to
both expected rewards or omitted rewards, and do not exhibit a
larger response (relative to an expected reward) to unexpected
rewards, thus being qualitatively different to the prediction error
signal evident in dopamine neurons (Schoenbaum et al., 2009;
Schoenbaum, Setlow, Saddoris, & Gallagher, 2003; Takahashi et
al., 2009), although there is some disagreement in the literature
(Sul et al., 2010).
We examined the activity of neurons in ACC, OFC, and LPFC
at the time when animals viewed a conditioned stimulus that
indicated the probability of receiving a reward, as well as at the
time of the outcome. We found that reward prediction error activ-
ity was evident only in ACC (Figure 3C), but that positive pre-
diction errors (response on rewarded trials; Figure 3A) were more
common than negative prediction errors (response on nonrewarded
trials; Figure 3C). We also showed that focal ACC lesions caused
reward-based, but not error-based, learning and decision-making
impairments (Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rush-
worth, 2006), consistent with a functional link between dopamine
and ACC for learning from positive prediction errors. Moreover,
the negative prediction error activity rarely took the form of a
depression of activity from baseline (e.g., Figure 3B), as has been
reported in dopamine neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Schultz et al.,
1997). However this finding may be attributable to the fact that
PFC neurons have heterogeneous baseline firing rates that are
typically lower than half of the dynamic range of the neuron, thus
it can be more difficult to detect a significant effect encoded by a
depression from baseline firing rate (compared to excitation from
baseline firing rate) simply because the range between baseline
and minimum firing rate is often much smaller than the range
between baseline and maximum firing rate. In sum, although some
PFC neurons—especially in ACC—encode the difference be-
tween expected and actual reward, this prediction error activity
tends to be qualitatively different than what is evident in dopamine
neurons.
Learning From Outcomes and the Guidance of
Subsequent Choices
To be able to survive in a changeable world, animals need to be
able not only to keep track of whether expected outcomes were
received, but also then to use this information to decide whether to
persist with the current response or adjust their behavior accord-
ingly. One of the most long-standing and oft-replicated findings is
that frontal lobe lesions can cause a variety of behavioral problems
when it is necessary to update response rules, alter attentional
focus, change associations, or explore alternative options. Al-
though LPFC has been more commonly associated with situations
in which a change in context is explicitly cued (Aron, Robbins, &
Poldrack, 2004; Stuss et al., 2000), parts of OFC, VMPFC, and
ACC appear particularly important when changes in outcome
signal a requirement to switch behavior (see reviews in Murray,
O’Doherty, & Schoenbaum, 2007; Walton, Rudebeck, Behrens, &
Rushworth, 2011).
The most commonly used task to probe this type of flexible
decision making has been reward-guided reversal learning (Figure
4A, B). Typically in such tasks, subjects choose between two
options, only one of which is consistently rewarded. However, at
certain points during a session once the rewarded option is being
reliably selected, the reward contingencies are reversed so that
subjects have to switch to select the alternative option to continue
to gain rewards. Importantly, no other cues are presented other
than the receipt or absence of reward to signal when to switch
between options to guide appropriate behavior.
As observed with previous tasks, it seems that the nature of the
value representation affects the regions implicated in these types of
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Figure 3. Single neurons encode reward prediction errors. (A and B) Spike density histograms illustrating the
activity of single neurons synched to the presentation of conditioned stimuli (left panels) associated with
different probabilities of reward delivery, or synched to the onset of reward on rewarded trials (middle columns)
or the expected onset of reward on nonrewarded trial (right columns). The vertical lines in the left panel indicate
the onset of the choice stimuli (left) and the time at which the animal was able to make his choice (right); the
vertical lines in the middle and right columns indicate the time at which the reward was (rewarded trial) or would
have been (nonrewarded trial) delivered following the choice. The different colored lines indicate the value of
the chosen probability stimulus which also determines the size of the prediction error (PE) where PE equals
1 - chosen probability for rewarded trials and 0 - chosen probability for nonrewarded trials. The lower row of
plots indicates the regression coefficients (RC) from a sliding linear regression, testing the relationship between
the neuron’s firing rate and the probability of reward delivery. Red data points indicate time points in which the
probability of reward delivery (or size of prediction error) significantly predicted the neuron’s firing rate. (A)
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) neuron encodes expected probability at the time of choice (left panel). This
neuron also encodes a positive prediction error at the time of reward onset (middle column), but is insensitive
to negative prediction errors (right column). (B) ACC neuron encodes expected probability at the time of choice
(left panel), encodes positive prediction errors on rewarded trials (middle column), and encodes negative
prediction errors on nonrewarded trials (right column). (C) Percentage of all neurons selective for positive
prediction errors only, negative prediction errors only, or both positive and negative prediction errors. ACC
neurons are more likely to encode positive prediction errors or both positive and negative prediction errors
relative to lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and OFC. OFC  orbitofrontal cortex. 
2 test,
 p  .05.
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reward across a block of trials. Action-outcome contingencies reversed (i.e., the other action became the
rewarded action) after animals had gained 25 rewards for a particular action. (C) Effect of orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) lesions on using reinforcement information in the stimulus-based reversal task. (From “Amygdala and
Orbitofrontal Cortex Lesions Differentially Influence Choices During Object Reversal Learning,” by P. H.
Rudebeck and E. A. Murray, 2008, Journal of Neuroscience, 28, p. 8341, Figure 5. Copyright 2008 by E. A.
Murray. Adapted with permission). (D) Effect of OFC lesions on using reinforcement information in the
action-based joystick reversal task (From “Frontal cortex subregions play distinct roles in choices between
actions and stimuli,” by P. H. Rudebeck, T. E. Behrens, S. W. Kennerley, M. G. Baxter, M. J. Buckley, M. E.
Walton, and M. F. Rushworth, 2008, Journal of Neuroscience, 28, p. 13781, Figure 5. Copyright 2008 by S. W.
Kennerley. Adapted with permission). (E) Effect of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) lesions on using reinforce-
ment information in the stimulus-based reversal task. (F) Effect of ACC lesions on using reinforcement
information in the action-based joystick reversal task (From “Optimal Decision Making and the Anterior
Cingulate Cortex,” by S. W. Kennerley, M. E. Walton, T. E. Behrens, M. J. Buckley, and M. F. Rushworth, 2006,
Nature Neuroscience, 9, p. 942, Figure 3. Copyright 2006 by S. W. Kennerley. Adapted with permission). E 
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included for each trial type for which every animal had at least 10 instances (which is why there are fewer trial
types in the analysis of the stimulus-based reversal task in Rudebeck & Murray, 2008, panel C).
309 DECISION MAKING AND REWARD IN FRONTAL CORTEXbehavior. Rudebeck and colleagues (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Rude-
beck & Murray, 2008) found that animals with OFC lesions, who
in previous studies had been shown to be impaired on a stimulus
reversal task when associations between visual stimuli and reward
changed, were just as able as control animals at updating their
choices on a comparable joystick-based response reversal task, in
which behavior was guided by associations between instrumental
actions and reward (Rudebeck et al., 2008). This suggests that the
OFC is not required to detect and respond to changes in reinforce-
ment generally, but instead is needed when there is a requirement
to update stimulus-reward associations. Conversely, ACC sulcus
lesions impair instrumental reversals but do not affect the speed of
reversal on a stimulus-based version of the task as measured by the
number of errors made prior to reaching a behavioral criterion
(though see below for subtle effects on performance based on
reinforcement history). A similar double dissociation between the
effects of OFC and ACC lesions has been observed in stimulus-
and action-based dynamic matching tasks respectively (Kennerley
et al., 2006; Rudebeck et al., 2008). Taken together, these findings
reinforce the notion that the OFC and ACC play vital roles not
merely when reward contingencies change but during all types of
choice-outcome associative learning.
Reversal tasks have been important tools for allowing investi-
gation of flexible behavior. Although they could simply be solved
using a win-stay, lose-switch strategy, animals nonetheless appear
to weigh the receipt or absence of reward as a piece of evidence in
an uncertain environment favoring one response option or an
alternative. The importance of this becomes clear when examining
OFC- or ACC-lesioned animals’ performance as a function of their
recent history of reinforcement following a change in reward
contingencies (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Kennerley et al., 2006;
Murray et al., 2007; Rudebeck et al., 2008; Rudebeck & Murray,
2008; see Figure 4). Normal subjects show an increased likelihood
of continuing to choose the correct option as they gather more
rewards for the now correct response. Both OFC- and ACC sulcus-
lesioned animals, by contrast, have a marked impairment in per-
sisting with the correct response during a stimulus- or action-based
reversal task, respectively, failing to continue to select the cur-
rently rewarded option at the same rate as control animals after
having received several rewards for such selections (Figure 4C,
4F). Nonetheless, both sets of animals do show an initial increased
tendency to switch to the rewarded option following a reversal,
demonstrating that they are not entirely insensitive to errors or
changes in reward information.
These results may at first seem at odds with the previous
discussion of the prevalence of ACC value encoding in stimulus-
based decision tasks (e.g., Figure 1). Although there may be a clear
functional bias for OFC and ACC being specialized for decisions
based on value assignments with stimuli and actions, respectively,
ACC-lesioned animals are also shown to be initially less willing to
persist with a correct response even on a stimulus-based task
(Figure 4e). Inactivation of ACC also has been shown to disrupt
learning about stimulus-outcome associations (Amiez et al., 2006).
However, the effect here following ACC lesions is qualitatively
different to that seen on the action-based reversal task or in
OFC-lesioned animals as they behave comparably to controls after
making more than three correct responses. This might relate to the
importance of ACC for representing the volatility of the reward
environment, which suggests that ACC may play a general role in
dictating how much influence individual outcomes should be given
to guide adaptive behavior and how much effort might need to be
expended to gain new information (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, &
Rushworth, 2007; Jocham, Neumann, Klein, Danielmeier, & Ull-
sperger, 2009). In contrast, there is little evidence to date that OFC
damage causes action-based decision-making impairments.
Multiple Learning Systems and Credit Assignment
It has been known for many years that there are many parallel
learning systems in the brain. In complex situations in which there
are multiple stimuli and outcome possibilities and when the precise
spatial and temporal structure of the environment is unknown, it
may not be possible to rely on a system that requires contingent
predictions to drive learning (“credit assignment” problem).
Thorndike (1933) described such a system that would assign the
weight of influence of an outcome not only to immediately pre-
ceding choices that led to that outcome, but also temporally con-
tiguous choices made in the recent past or even closely following
this outcome (“spread-of-effect”). However, although such a learn-
ing system may be adequate in situations in which choice and/or
reward histories are relatively uniform, in rapidly changeable or
low reward yielding environments in which such conditions are
not met, the mixed pattern of choice and reward histories will
compromise the accuracy of such stimulus value approximations,
resulting in a specific pattern of behavioral impairments. Although
some prefrontal cells are tuned for specific choice-outcome con-
junctions (Seo & Lee, 2009; Uchida, Lu, Ohmae, Takahashi, &
Kitazawa, 2007) and others encode an extended history of past
choices or outcomes (Seo et al., 2007; Seo & Lee, 2007, 2009; Sul
et al., 2010), little is known about which type of learning might be
performed by such neurons.
To investigate the role of OFC in guiding different learning
systems in complex, changeable environments, Walton, Rude-
beck, and colleagues (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Walton et al.,
2010) tested macaque monkeys on a series of changeable three-
armed bandit tasks, in which fluctuations in outcome value
associated with each stimulus could change dynamically over
the course of the session so that at some points in the session,
the identity of the most highly rewarding option also changed.
Following OFC lesions, the animals were markedly impaired
when a change in stimulus value occurred in synchrony with a
change in the identity of the highest rewarding stimulus (Figure
5A). Nonetheless, these same animals were just as able as
controls to flexibly track local changes in reward likelihood of
the currently chosen option when the identity of the highest
rewarding stimulus stayed the same (Figure 5B).
To probe the influence of different learning strategies, we per-
formed a multiple logistic regression, which examined the weight
of influence of all possible combinations of recent choices and
outcomes on current behavior across multiple changeable three-
armed bandit tasks (Figure 5C). Normal animals’ choices were
dominated by appropriate contingent associations between the
stimuli that they had selected and the outcomes they received for
each of those choices. By contrast, OFC lesions profoundly re-
duced the ability of specific recent associations to guide behavior
while leaving intact the influence based on associations between
the integrated recent history of choices and recent history of
outcomes. The latter spread-of-effect was no greater than in the
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Figure 5. Choices on a changeable three-armed bandit task and the influences on current behavior. (A) Two
example predetermined reward schedules. The schedules determined whether reward was delivered for selecting
a stimulus (stimulus A to C) on a particular trial. Dashed black lines represent the reversal point in the schedule
when the identity of the highest value stimulus changes. (B) Average likelihood of choosing the highest value
stimulus in the two schedules in the control (solid black line) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) groups (dashed
black line). SEMs are filled gray and blue areas respectively for the two groups. Colored points represent the
reward probability of the highest value stimulus. (C) Matrix of components included in logistic regression and
influence of (i) recent choices and their specific outcomes (red Xs, bottom right graph); (ii) the previous choice
and each recent past outcome (blue Xs, top right graph); and (iii) the previous outcome and each recent past
choice (green Xs, bottom left graph), on current behavior. Green area represents influence of associations
between choices and rewards received in the past; blue area represents the influence of associations between past
rewards and choices made in the subsequent trials. The data for the first trial in the past in the three plots are
identical. Controls, solid black lines; OFCs, dashed gray lines. From “Separable Learning Systems in the
Macaque Brain and the Role of Orbitofrontal Cortex in Contingent Learning,” by M. E. Walton, T. E. Behrens,
M. J. Buckley, P. H. Rudebeck, and M. F. Rushworth, 2010, Neuron, 65, p. 928–929, 933, Figures 1, 2, 5.
Copyright 2010 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission.
311 DECISION MAKING AND REWARD IN FRONTAL CORTEXnormal animals, suggesting that the resultant change in behavior
following the lesion was not caused by functional compensation
but instead by the unmasking of an existing learning system, the
influence of which is usually dwarfed by a mechanism to make
specific contingent choice-reward associations.
One interpretation of these results is that OFC is primarily a
system to allow rapid learning about the contingent relationships
between stimuli and outcomes. In this light, encoding of stimulus
identity and value might be considered as important not simply for
the guidance of decisions but also for supporting appropriate credit
assignment when there are multiple possible causes for a particular
outcome. From this perspective, OFC might be less involved when
decisions are made between stimuli with well-learned value asso-
ciations. This is consistent with the finding that there are a smaller
proportion of OFC neurons than in other frontal areas which
encode value when decisions are made between well-learned stim-
uli (Kennerley et al., 2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009a).
The Ubiquity of Value Representations: Valence
Versus Saliency
As we discussed in the Introduction, it is now clear that single
neurons across most regions of the brain encode a value signal to
some varying degree. The firing of action potentials requires
energy and thus if we assume that the brain acts like most biolog-
ical organisms in that it seeks to conserve energy, it is reasonable
to think that a ubiquitous representation of value is not simply a
redundant signal; rather value representations in different brain
areas are likely to serve different functions, even if we as inves-
tigators have yet to fully describe the functional differences of
these representations across areas. Compounding this issue, given
the limited complexity of behavioral tasks used, or because of
extensive overtraining on a behavioral task, the value functions
within a brain area may change to meet task demands, or shift/
spread between areas, just as other goal-relevant representations
shift during learning (Amiez et al., 2006; M. Matsumoto et al.,
2007; Pasupathy & Miller, 2005; Procyk, Tanaka, & Joseph, 2000;
Schoenbaum, Chiba, & Gallagher, 1999; Tremblay & Schultz,
2000a).
An additional factor clouding the issue of functional specializa-
tion of value coding is the degree to which value signals can be
independently interpreted from saliency signals (Maunsell, 2004;
Roesch & Olson, 2003, 2007; Tobler, Dickinson, & Schultz,
2003). Humans and animals are naturally more motivated by more
valuable outcomes, thus processes like attention, arousal, motiva-
tion, or motor preparation all strongly correlate with value. The
studies by Roesch and colleagues highlighted this issue by record-
ing from many different frontal areas. These authors found that
neurons encoding reward magnitude were most prevalent in pre-
motor (rather than PFC) areas, which could reflect the way in
which increasing value motivates the motor system to facilitate
behavior (Roesch & Olson, 2003). In a subsequent experiment in
which they manipulated both the reward and potential penalty of
an outcome, these authors were able to demonstrate that neurons in
OFC encode a linear value signal while neurons in premotor cortex
encode a saliency signal (Roesch & Olson, 2004). However most
studies do not manipulate both the costs and benefits of a choice,
and thus even if we identify neurons that apparently encode a
signal reflecting the subjective rewarding value of an outcome,
these neurons could simply be encoding a saliency signal.
One approach to resolve the valence versus salience confound is
to design experiments that contain both appetitive and aversive
outcomes, although for ethical reasons, this is often difficult to do
in animal studies and therefore much less is known about how
aversive outcomes are represented in the brain compared to appet-
itive outcomes. A brain area that encodes a value signal should
encode both rewarding and aversive events on a linear scale,
typically being positive for appetitive stimuli and negative for
aversive stimuli. In contrast, saliency signals increase as a function
of behavioral importance irrespective of its valence, and thus
typically follow a v-shaped curve with increasing activation for
both increasingly rewarding and increasingly aversive stimuli.
LPFC, OFC and premotor cortex each contain neurons that exhibit
preferences for aversive or rewarding valence. However, for neu-
rons that encode both positive and negative valence, OFC neurons
encode valence along a common value scale whereas premotor and
LPFC neurons tend to be modulated both by large rewards and
large punishments, indicative of a salience signal (Hosokawa et al.,
2007; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Morrison & Salzman, 2009; Roesch
& Olson, 2004; Scangos & Stuphorn, 2010). In summary, disam-
biguating the initial abstraction of an option’s value from the
associated cognitive processes that arise from the recognition that
an option is valuable (e.g., attention, arousal, motivation) is para-
mount to advancing our understanding of the specialized functions
of reward representations in different brain areas.
Conclusions
Recent frameworks of decision making have helped define some
of the essential value computations underling optimal choice (Ran-
gel et al., 2008). Using this framework, we compared the func-
tional correspondence between neurophysiological and neuropsy-
chological studies to help define the roles of different PFC areas in
supporting optimal decision-making. VMPFC and the adjacent
OFC seem to have an important role in determining the current
incentive value of a behavioral outcome, potentially influenced by
current internal states. In addition, OFC appears essential in as-
signing the value of an outcome to the choice that produced that
outcome (credit assignment). ACC may integrate information
about a decision’s expected value (potentially from signals in OFC
and amygdala) with information about an action’s value to deter-
mine the overall value (utility) of each choice alternative. Al-
though it is less clear precisely how the different choice alterna-
tives are compared to determine the optimal choice, recent
evidence from both functional neuroimaging and lesion studies
suggests VMPFC may be important for this function. Both ACC
and LPFC are sensitive to outcomes and appear to track the history
of choices and outcomes. Moreover, ACC neurons encode a re-
ward prediction error signal, suggesting these areas may be im-
portant for adaptive decision making. In addition to value infor-
mation, LPFC also encodes a variety of behaviorally relevant
information (e.g., object features and/or location, categories,
rules), suggesting LPFC’s encoding of value information may
support allocation of attentional resources or cognitive control
toward behaviorally relevant information (Hare et al., 2009; Ken-
nerley & Wallis, 2009c; Lebedev et al., 2004; Miller & Cohen,
2001; Wise, 2008). Although we highlighted a number of impor-
312 KENNERLEY AND WALTONtant computations necessary for optimal choice, many of these
value representations are highly correlated, and thus disambiguat-
ing these representations to infer functional specialization between
areas continues to be a challenge (Behrens et al., 2007; Hare,
O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008). Moreover, the
ubiquity of these representations across multiple brain areas em-
phasizes the importance of direct comparison of different brain
areas to determine the functional order and hierarchy in which
these value computations are being performed (Kennerley et al.,
2009; Kennerley & Wallis, 2009a; Roesch & Olson, 2003; Wallis
& Kennerley, 2010).
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